More on E.O. Wilson’s THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF NATURE. June 9, 2012
Posted by ronwhite54 in Public Policy.Tags: "The Social Conquest of Nature, biological evolution, cooperation, cultural evolution, E.O. Wilson, evolution of warfare, evolution or commerce
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Like I said in my previous APLS blog entry, there is a lot to ponder in E.O. Wilson’s new book, The Social Conquest of Nature. Here I would like to continue my argument that cultural evolution often trumps (and elucidates) biological evolution. The most obvious point would be that biological science itself evolves based on cultural evolution. The basic argument in support of cultural evolution is that cultural beliefs evolve based on variation and selection. Beliefs are irrevocably in the minds of individuals. Individual minds are comprised by competing old beliefs and new beliefs. Our minds are mostly conservative, therefore, new beliefs are at a competititive disadvantage. The number of new ideas that enter this competition is relative to an intellectual environment. High-level global belief systems (world religions, global science) have more believers than low-level belief systems (cults). Therefore, these high-level belief systems are more likely to be innovative.
Now what does all of this this say about the dramatic increase in the rate and scale of cultural evolution after the Agricultural Revolution? Wilson and most scientists believe that before the AR humans lived in small insular groups of about 30 hunters and gatherers. In those small groups of hunters and gatherers orthodoxy was easily maintained via non-coercive, mostly democratic means. There was very little need or opportunity for innovation or cultural evolution for the first 3 million years of human existence. And, there was no permanent nest to defend. Although, there is some question as to the level of violence between these groups, one might surmise that extensive warfare probably didn’t exist at a large scale prior to the AR. Or, one might argue that post AR humans were more peaceful and that the incidence of human violence today is relatively low. In chapter 19, Wilson identifies five stages in the emergence of eusociality: formation of groups, occupy defensible nests, rise of caste systems (dominance hierarchies)in humans. The most important is the rise of permanent, defensible nests. As the size of human nests increased and specialized labor increased (especially defense-relate labor) and communitities were able to increase in size and complexity. However, Hayek and others argued that one cannot account for the increase in the size of human communities based on “natural” small group morality. Therefore, “large group morality” must have been discovered by trial and error and passed on via teaching and learning. Markets, for example, emerged after pre-AR humans “discovered” that if they don’t kill strangers, if they don’t steal, and if they keep their promises, then then they can engage in reciprocal relationships and everyone is better off. Now, there no doubt is a genetic basis for these rules, however, the puzzle is why didn’t these rules and global trade emerge earlier in human history? Another puzzle is why did the military (and military values) take over these large groups? And, why has there been so much technological innovation associated with the military? In other words, why did the “defense of the nest” lead to perpetual warfare? But how did the omnipresent quest for self-defense and military culture affect the early rise of global trade (and commercial values)? If we are by nature small-group cooperators, how can we expect to live peacefully in large groups ruled by security-seeking military regimes? Any theory that seeks to explain that transition from “small group” to “large group” socialization during the Argricultural Revolution must explain how it spawned BOTH security-seeking military culture (perpetual warfare) AND the emergence of global markets (perpetual trade). One of the weaknesses in Wilson’s account is that he did not attempt to explain the collateral rise of both eusocial commercial enterprise and anti-eusocial military culture. In other words, maybe “defense of the nest” led to the rise of both cooperative eusocial culture and competitive anti-eusocial culture. We’re still a long way from understanding the co-evolutionary basis of military culture and commercial culture.
First time reading this blog and I have a few questions and comments. I am not very familiar with the literature in your field so please feel free to refer to works that I should read.
First, why do you assume that the innovativeness of belief systems scales with the number of believers? Wouldn’t small groups have more ability to build beliefs and rituals that deviate from historical precedents since there is less inertia to overcome? In biology, innovation often occurs more quickly in small, isolated groups. Would a large population in one high-level belief system be more innovative when compared with that same population divided into 10 small low-level belief systems?
Also, I’m interested in why you believe that it is a puzzle that military culture evolves with global commercial trade. It would seem to me that a security-focused military culture would have been necessary for maintaining cultural barriers within which a culture would be able to develop a complexity that would produce specialized goods that would be desirable for other cultures.
Clearly, there are extremes of militarism which would impede trade. If no one could pass through the boundaries between cultures there would be no opportunity to learn about what is available to trade in other cultures. However, the opposite extreme is also a barrier to the development of trade. Without the ability to maintain cultural barriers through military force, culture in a region would tend to homogenize and trade would tend to be limited to goods which are distributed unevenly across geographic regions rather than between goods that are the product of learning processes that are rooted in one culture.
Historically, it seems that the geographic range of trade grew quite evenly between trade and warfare. Trade couldn’t be global until technology changed to lower transportation costs to the point where it became economical to bring goods in from the other side of the world. And if it was economical to take goods to exchange for other goods it was likely economical to take soldiers to seize those goods by force. (If you meant global in the sense of “open to everyone” then I retract this point)